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Abstract—Traditionally, vulnerability is the level of degrada-
tion caused by failures or disturbances, and resilience is the
ability to recover after a high-impact event. This paper presents
a topological procedure based on graph theory to evaluate the
vulnerability and resilience of power grids. A cascading failures
model is developed by eliminating lines both deliberately and
randomly, and four restoration strategies inspired by the network
approach are proposed. In the two cases, the degradation and
recovery of the electrical infrastructure are quantified through
four centrality measures. Here, an index called flow-capacity
is proposed to measure the level of network overload during
the iterative processes. The developed sequential framework was
tested on a graph of 600 nodes and 1196 edges built from the
400 kV high-voltage power system in Spain. The conclusions
obtained show that the statistical graph indices measure different
topological aspects of the network, so it is essential to combine
the results to obtain a broader view of the structural behaviour
of the infrastructure.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, graph theory, power sys-
tems, resilience, vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The complexity of power systems has increased in recent
years due to the process of energy transition towards an
increasingly electrified society. This energy transition has
required significant effort to analyse and prevent disruptions,
to improve power quality and continuity indicators, and to
protect critical energy infrastructures [1].
Reliability and vulnerability have become the watchwords
for electric utilities in terms of managing the above risks.
Reliability is the ability of the electrical network to meet
demand continuously and with an acceptable level of quality
[2]. Vulnerability is the degradation of the system after assets
fail due to malfunctions, attacks, or disruptions [3].
More recently, resilience is a concept that has attracted
attention as planners began to think about the increase in
natural disasters produced by climate change, human-made
interference due to malicious cyber-attacks, and instability
caused by the addition of large quantities of renewable energy
[4]. Resilience does not yet have a clear definition; however,
some define it as the ability of infrastructure to adapt, absorb,
and recover from a disturbance [5].
The restoration of a power system depends on both its
robustness and the speed of load recovery. An electrical infras-
tructure can operate in stable conditions until an asset fails,
which could trigger adverse effects and degrade a significant
part of the network. On the latter condition, operators execute
iterative actions to recover the demand for electricity.
This is an area of current research. In the scientific literature,
most of investigations focus on the resilience of the power net-
work to climate events, proposing metrics and quantifying the
operational state during such episodes [6]. Other approaches
consider modifying the network topology to minimise the
impact of disturbances and reduce the probability of blackouts.
The resulting procedures are of interest because of their direct
applicability to other available techniques [7].
Some models quantify the phases experienced by the power
grid during high-impact events in order to increase resilience
[8]. Other studies consider not only the above aspect but also
incorporate the effects of contingencies [9].
Experts point out that resilience is an intrinsic property
which implies a process of detection, anticipation, learning,
and adaptation [10]. They define and quantify it in terms
of criticality, frequency, impact, and recovery. Under these
assumptions, the most relevant works employ the techniques
of modularity, graph theory, multi-criteria, fuzzy theory, and
information gap decision theory to address the above problem
[11]–[15].
Reliability, vulnerability, and resilience assess the operation
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and performance of the power grid, so it is necessary to study
them together to minimise the interruption of the power supply
in the event of contingencies. Here, it is important to note
that there is only related work on the joint consideration of
reliability and vulnerability, and documents on vulnerability
and resilience are barely receiving any attention [16].
Because of the above, this paper presents an original proce-
dure based on complex network theory to sequentially study
the vulnerability and resilience of electrical infrastructures.
The network approach is already a widely validated and used
technique in the scientific literature to carry out this kind of
study. The resulting methodology only needs the topology of
the network under study as an input, so it is suitable for those
analyses where technical information is not available or is not
open access.
The vulnerability study is carried out by degrading the
performance of the electrical network through a cascading
failures procedure, and the resilience study is performed by
executing the iterative reconnection of the disconnected power
lines. The cascading failures model consists of removing
the links, one by one, according to two removal strategies:
deliberately and randomly. In the meantime, the reconnection
model, which also works on a one-by-one basis, considers
four restoration strategies for the lines: random, subgraph,
shortest paths, and degree. In both cases, the quantification of
vulnerability and resilience is done by measuring the largest
connected component, the connection rate, the weighted effi-
ciency, and the flow-capacity indices. The first three indicators
are widely known in the scientific literature, while the fourth
indicator is proposed to more precisely measure the level of
infrastructure overload. These procedures and strategies follow
the guidelines of graph theory. The case study corresponds to
a graph composed of 600 nodes and 1196 edges, based on
the structure and topology of the 400 kV high-voltage electric
power system in Spain. This research shows that resilience is
a legitimate field of study involving not only industry but also
academia and research centres.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
describes the disintegration and recovery strategies proposed
to perform the two studies under consideration. Section III
details the case study based on the Spanish high-voltage
power grid. Section IV presents and discusses the vulnerability
and resilience outcomes obtained in this manuscript. Lastly,
Section V draws the main conclusions and details some future
research directions.
II. DISINTEGRATION AND RECOVERY STRATEGIES
Reliability and vulnerability studies are well-documented
approaches in the scientific literature. On the one hand, re-
liability indices analyse the continuity of the operations in
case of failure of one or two assets (n-1 or n-2 contingencies),
measuring metrics such as the frequency and duration of power
outages, the expected energy not supplied, among others.
On the other hand, vulnerability indices study the weakness
and measure the performance under cascading failures (n-k
contingencies), using steady-state power flow models.
Graph theory is an efficient approach to study cascading
failures in power grids and, consequently, to evaluate both
the disintegration and the recovery of the infrastructures.
This technique involves mapping the network topology and
converting each of the assets to nodes and edges in a graph
[17].
A. Network performance indices
The development procedure requires statistical indicators to
quantify the levels of vulnerability and resilience of the elec-
trical infrastructure iteratively. In this article, the largest con-
nected component, connection rate, and weighted efficiency
indices are used, and the flow-capacity index is proposed. This
last indicator is not intended to replace the traditional indices,
but rather to complement them in order to obtain a broader
view of the operational state of the system. Each index is
described below.
• Largest connected component or LCC: this topological
index quantifies the largest connected subgraph during
the cascading failures and recovery processes;
• Connection rate or CR: this is an indicator that measures
not only the largest subgraph but also all islands or
subnetworks. Unlike the LCC measure, the CR index
quantifies all operational networks in both disintegration
and recovery;
• Weighted efficiency or WEFF: this centrality measure
quantifies the effectiveness with which information can
be exchanged within the network. In both an unweighted
and a weighted graph, the flow between two nodes travels
over the shortest geodesic distance. This distance is, in
the first type of network, the minimum count of edges that
must be travelled to join a pair of nodes, and in the second
type of network, the minimum sum of the weights of each
edge that must be passed to join two nodes. Thus, in a
power system where the weights represent the capacity of
the links, a higher weight implies a higher capacity route,
so the reciprocal of the weight must be taken to calculate
the shortest weighted route. A more detailed description
of this index can be found in [18];
• Flow-capacity or FC: this is an index which measures
the overload of the network compared to its base case,
i.e. before the occurrence of contingencies. This measure
serves as a complement to the WEFF indicator. The FC









where FC is the level of network overload in the iteration
s, Ci is the capacity of the line i, EB is the betweenness
score of the line i in the iteration s, and n is the total
number of links in the network.
Note that a high FC score indicates that the lines are
operating below capacity; on the contrary, a low FC score
indicates that the lines are operating above capacity.
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B. Network attack and recovery strategies
In this paper, the vulnerability and resilience assessment of
power systems is carried out through the sequential execution
of a cascading failures model and an iterative reconnection
model of disconnected electrical lines.
On the one hand, the cascading failures model is performed
by iteratively removing the edges of the graph, which implies
n-1 contingencies on a power grid that continually changes its
topology after each removal. Each event is associated with a
contingency, and therefore, with an iteration in the process of
infrastructure disintegration.
The removal of the links is conducted using the following
two strategies:
• Deliberate removals: power lines are deleted, in descend-
ing order, according to their edge betweenness score.
Links with high scores are removed first. This strategy
represents those events carried out by malicious agents,
e.g. acts of vandalism, terrorism, cyber-attacks, among
others;
• Random removals: power lines are randomly discon-
nected. These events correspond to malfunction of the
protection equipment, technical failures, human errors,
among others. Here, three simulation samples are run to
avoid randomness in the results.
On the other hand, the reconnection model is developed by
reconnecting the transmission lines removed by the cascading
effects, that is, those calculated in the previous model. The
following four strategies, inspired by complex network theory,
are considered to determine the order of edge reconnection:
• Shortest paths: electrical lines are reconnected based on
their EB score in the fully connected graph. That is, if
the shortest weighted path between a pair of nodes is the
longest in the network, this edge is reconnected first;
• Subgraph: electrical lines are reconnected according to
the size of the subnets. In other words, the disconnected
lines of the largest subgraphs are re-established first;
• Degree: electrical lines from the hub nodes are first
reconnected in descending order;
• Random: electrical lines are randomly reconnected at
each step.
III. CURRENT TOPOLOGY OF THE SPANISH HIGH-VOLTAGE
POWER SYSTEM
In this document, the 400 kV power grid in Spain is used
to test the disintegration and recovery procedures developed.
This electrical network is made up of more than 21,000 km
of high-voltage power lines, more than 1000 substations, and
more than 80,000 MVA of transformation capacity [16].
Using the above information, a synthetic network composed
of 600 nodes and 1196 edges was generated (see Fig. 1).
This network only considered substations, generators, loads,
power lines, and transformers, without taking into account
the technical parameters of the assets. The resulting graph
is a scale-free network that follows a power-law distribution,
P (k)∼k−γ , and has the growth and preferential attachment
Fig. 1. Scale-free network of the Spanish high-voltage power system.
characteristics of real complex systems [16]. These types of
graphs are useful for evaluating the structural robustness and
vulnerability of networks and characterising their topological
properties through centrality measures [19].
The objective of this research is to propose a useful and
straightforward procedure that can be applied in studies where
technical information on the electrical infrastructure is not
readily available. The resulting framework should attempt to
emulate the structural behaviour of a real power system when
it is subject to multiple contingencies. Of course, this is a
challenging task to perform when only the network topology
is provided. Because of that, three simulation assumptions are
made following the provision of complex network theory to
try to address these shortcomings.
1) In a power system, transmission lines are the assets
responsible for carrying the electrical energy produced
in the generation centres to the consumption centres,
where it is used for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes. The power transmission capacity is limited by
the operational and security characteristics of the links.
In the scale-free network used in this study, the edges
are transmission lines, and each one has a pre-selected
transfer threshold;
2) The objective of the load flow study is to obtain the
voltage and angle magnitudes in each bus for specified
load and power conditions. Once this information is
known, the power flows in the lines and generators
are calculated. In the developed topological framework,
the flows are transmitted over the shortest geodesic
distance between two nodes, i.e. the minimum count
of edges that must be travelled to join them. Here, the
edge betweenness (EB) index is used to calculate the
analogous flows in the network links [20]. Theoretically,
the higher the index score, the higher the flow through
the edges. Geodesic distances are calculated using the
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Fig. 2. Disintegration curves of the Spanish power grid.
Bellman-Ford algorithm [21];
3) The transfer capacities (C) of the links are calculated
by normalising the EB score of each edge to the largest
value in the graph. This can be expressed as follows:
Ci =
EBi0
max(EB10 , EB20 , . . . , EBn0)
(2)
where Ci is the threshold of the link i and EB is the
edge betweenness score of line i at the zero stage, i.e.
when the graph is entirely connected.
Note that flows and capacities are balanced at the beginning
of the simulation and that they do not change during decom-
position and recovery stages. However, both the structure and
the topology do change as the edges are removed, which in-
fluences the EB scores. This unbalances operating conditions,
induces failures in the assets, breaks the balance in the load
distribution, and degrades the performance of the network.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the simulation results obtained when apply-
ing the cascading failures and recovery models are presented
and described. Here, the Spanish high-voltage power grid is
used as a case study and the performance indicators proposed
above are measured.
It is important to note that the developed procedures only
take into account the connectivity of the topology and do not
incorporate the electrical parameters of the infrastructure under
study. Also, under real conditions, power system disintegration
and recovery occur in seconds and minutes, respectively. In
the restoration process, there is no consensus in the industry
on the maximum number of lines that can be operated at
each stage, as this will depend on the physical characteristics
and procedures applied by each control centre, to ensure the
safe operation of the system. The impacts of time could be
considered by establishing a reconnection time and quantifying
the number of safe manoeuvres in each strategy.
Both models were programmed and executed on the Mat-
labR2019 platform, using a computer with an Intel® CoreTM
i7 processor, 3.40 GHz CPU and 16 GB of RAM.
A. Vulnerability assessment
Fig. 2 reports the disintegration of the infrastructure studied
for both deliberate and random edge removal. In this simula-
tion, the 1196 links are eliminated, and the indices described
in Section II.A are quantified. Here, the LCC, CR, and WEFF
measures take a value equal to 1 when all links are connected.
Then, they decrease progressively, as the graph decomposes,
until they reach a value equal to 0, i.e. when all links are
removed. The latter represents the theoretical interruption of
the power supply. In contrast, the FC measure increases when
links operate below their capacity and decreases when they
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Fig. 3. Recovery curves of the Spanish power grid.
operate above their overload threshold. This index has a value
equal to 0 when the graph is completely disconnected.
On the one hand, deliberate attacks are those perpetrated by
malicious agents, such as acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, and
acts of vandalism, among others. The red curves are obtained
by removing the links according to its edge betweenness score
in descending order. On the other hand, random events are
those related to risks of a random nature, such as natural
phenomena or technical failures in devices and hardware. The
blue curves are obtained by randomly removing the edges and
averaging the set of results from three independent samples.
Overall, deliberate attacks impact the performance of the
infrastructure more dramatically compared to random events.
However, their measurements are lower during the early stages
when trends between the red and blue curves are analysed.
For example, the LCC and CR indices decrease from iteration
44 in the case of random removals, while they decrease until
iteration 227 in the case of deliberate attacks. Despite all of
the above, decomposition is faster once the cascading failure
takes place.
On the other hand, the WEFF and FC indicators again
confirm the conclusion obtained previously, i.e. deliberate
attacks are an efficient strategy to reduce the connectivity
of the electrical network. Observe how the red curve of
the WEFF index decreases abruptly from the first iterations,
degrading the structural performance and reaching a value
of zero before the other strategy. However, the FC measure
proposed in this article reveals that the network operates most
of the time with lower loads compared to its base case. This
shows the possibility of implementing containment strategies
for cascading failures in order to avoid the total collapse of the
infrastructure. There are already studies addressing the above
problem [22], [23].
B. Resilience assessment
The restoration process takes place immediately after 55%
of the edges are randomly removed (blue curves in Fig. 2).
This percentage is intended for simulation purposes only. In
each iteration, one line is added according to the shortest paths,
subgraph, degree, and random strategies. The largest connected
component, connection rate, weighted efficiency, and flow-
capacity indices are also measured during the recovery of the
network. Here, the LCC, CR, and WEFF measures increase
progressively, until they reach a value equal to 1, as the
graph recovers its edges. The FC index maintains the same
philosophy already mentioned, i.e. it increases when all lines
operate below their capacity and decreases when all links
operate above their capacity.
The curves in Fig. 3 show that the recovery of the network
varies according to the four proposed strategies. By analysing
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Figs. 3 (a) and (b), for example, the shorthest path strategy (red
curve) is more effective in reconnecting the graph because the
two performance indices are above the other values obtained.
On the contrary, the subgraph strategy (green curve) is less
successful in recovering the meshing of the network.
However, Fig. 3 (c) shows that the degree strategy (cyan
curve) is more suitable than the shortest approach to recover
the operational state from the weighted efficiency point of
view of the system. In this particular case, reconnecting the
hub nodes increases structural robustness and facilitates the
redistribution of flows within the system. This phenomenon is
well studied in network science [16].
Fig. 3 (d), on the other hand, demonstrates that the FC index
decreases until the fully connected network state is achieved.
Here, the degree strategy is also an efficient reconnection
approach because it causes a gradual and progressive increase
in the load on the infrastructure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this manuscript, a topological procedure based on graph
theory was proposed to assess both the vulnerability and
the resilience of power systems. The vulnerability assessment
considered the disintegration of the network using a cascading
failures model, while the resilience assessment addressed
the recovery of the infrastructure employing a planned and
iterative reconnection model for power lines. The case study
used the Spanish power grid, through which a graph composed
of 600 nodes and 1196 edges was generated.
The results show that there are different strategies to recover
the operating conditions of the electrical infrastructure after
a collapse or blackout. In a sense, this favours the system
operator by allowing her/him to select the best application
approach for her/his network.
Power systems with high penetration of renewable energy
operate close to their limits and face more uncertainty. Because
of this, future research should be oriented to the current energy
transition scenario, where these sources are expected to be the
main producers of electrical energy, especially wind and solar.
That is, the random nature of renewable energy technologies
could condition the formulation of stochastic mathematical
models to assess the robustness, reliability, and resilience of
critical energy infrastructures.
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